

# Analysis of the Zeroconf Protocol Using UPPAAL

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# Case Study: Address Configuration in Zeroconf

Protocol for **dynamic configuration** of IPv4 link-local addresses.

**Standardized** by IETF in RFC 3927.

**Philosophy**: internet should be like electricity, i.e., work when you plug in a cable.

Several implementations available, notably **Bonjour** from Apple.

See [www.zeroconf.org](http://www.zeroconf.org).

# Mutual Exclusion

Zeroconf can be viewed as a distributed **mutual exclusion** algorithm in which the resources are IP addresses.

Zeroconf is similar to Fisher's mutual exclusion algorithm and makes **essential use of timing**. But whereas Fischer uses a shared variable for communication, Zeroconf uses broadcast communication.

Within Zeroconf, hosts do not aim at acquiring access to a **specific** CS; but just to **one out of 65024** available CSs.

# A Simple Stochastic Model

Bohnenkamp, Van der Stok, Hermanns and Vaandrager (IPDS03) develop simple stochastic cost model of Zeroconf.

Analytical expression is derived for user penalty, and used to derive optimal configuration parameters of the network.

Is this model correct? Or do real Zeroconf implementations behave differently?

# Motivation

Our society increasingly depends on correct functioning of (implementations of) communication protocols.

Standards that define these protocol are written in informal language, with frequent ambiguities, omissions and inconsistencies.

We can blame the **engineers** (for not using formal methods), the **companies** (for playing political games), but also **ourselves**, i.e., the formal methods researchers.

# Formal Methods

There is ample evidence that formal (mathematical) techniques may help to improve quality of protocol standards. Still, they are rarely used in (the authoritative part of) protocol standards:

- ▶ Engineers have difficulties with formal notations (they do like FSMs and C).
- ▶ Relationship between formal models and protocols often unclear ("model hacking")

Recently, the timed automata model checker Uppaal has been extended with C-like functions, and the verification engine has become much more powerful (e.g. due to symmetry reduction).

Can we use Uppaal for building a model of (a fragment of) a protocol standard that

- (a) is easy to understand by engineers,
- (b) comes as close as possible to informal text,
- (c) may serve as basis for automatic verification?

# Assumptions about Underlying Network


*"This specification applies to all IEEE 802 Local Area Networks (LANs) [802], including Ethernet [802.3], Token-Ring [802.5] and IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs [802.11], as well as to other link-layer technologies that operate at data rates of at least 1 Mbps, have a round-trip latency of at most one second, and support ARP [RFC826]."*

# Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)

Widely used method for converting protocol addresses (e.g., IP) to local network ("hardware") addresses (e.g., Ethernet).  
Within Zeroconf all messages are ARP packets.

```
typedef struct{
    HAType senderHA; // sender hardware address
    IPType senderIP; // sender IP address
    IPType targetIP; // target IP address
    bool request; // is the packet a Request or a Reply
}ARP_packet;
```

# Network Model



Several identical network automata in model. Each of these automata takes care of broadcasting single message (and reply) and has a clock to ensure roundtrip delay of 1sec.  
We assume hosts handle incoming messages instantaneously.


# Model Architecture

For each host  $j$  there are three automata (“process based decomposition”):

1. An automaton that models **address configuration**.
2. An automaton that handles **incoming messages**.
3. An automaton that models the **other processes** running on the host (which may send regular ARP packets).

In addition we have a collection of **Network** automata.

# Zeroconf Address Configuration



# Close Correspondence Between Model and Standard


Example text from RFC [page 11, section 2.2.1]:

*"When ready to begin probing, the host should then wait for a random time interval selected uniformly in the range zero to PROBE\_WAIT seconds, and should then send PROBE\_NUM probe packets, each of these probe packets spaced randomly, PROBE\_MIN to PROBE\_MAX seconds apart."*

## “Mistakes” in Standard

- ▶ It does not specify upper and lower bounds on time that may elapse between sending last ARP Probe and sending first ARP Announcement.
- ▶ It does not specify whether a host may immediately start using a newly claimed address or whether it should first send out all ARP Announcements.
- ▶ It does not specify tolerance on timing of ARP Announcements.

# Input Handling



## Input Handling (cnt)

Input handling described at various places in standard.

Conceptually it is natural to group everything together in one module.

Function `ihandler` distinguishes between 9 scenarios, each of which is described explicitly or implicitly in the standard.


## Example Scenario as Described in RFC

*"In addition, if during this period [from the beginning of the probing process until ANNOUNCE\_WAIT seconds after the last probe packet is sent] the host receives any ARP Probe where the packet's 'target IP address' is the address being probed for, and the packet's 'sender hardware address' is not the hardware address of the interface the host is attempting to configure, then the host MUST similarly treat this as an address conflict and select a new address as above. This can occur if two (or more) hosts attempt to configure the same IPv4 Link-Local address at the same time."*

## Further “Mistakes” in Standard

- ▶ Although standard states that Zeroconf requires an underlying network that supports ARP (RFC 826), we identified some cases where Zeroconf does not conform to RFC 826.
- ▶ It is not exactly clear in which situations a host may defend its address.

# Network Automaton



# Model Checking

Model checking Zeroconf is difficult!

Using latest version of Uppaal, we managed to prove mutual exclusion and absence of deadlock for model with 2 hosts, 1 IP address and 2 network automata.

Model checking failed for larger models.

# Abstractions

1. Dead variable elimination
2. Over approximation: elimination of counter `ConflictNum`
3. Over approximation: elimination of clock  $y$

Using these abstractions (on top of those implemented in Uppaal)  
we can prove mutual exclusion for models with  
3 hosts, 1 IP address and 3 network automata, or  
2 hosts, **2** IP addresses and 2 network automata.


# A Manual Proof

It is pretty obvious that Zeroconf satisfies mutual exclusion.

Large number of messages in the protocol “obscures” key correctness argument for model checker.

# Manual Proof of Mutual Exclusion

Suppose two hosts  $i$  and  $j$  enter CS. Assume wlog that  $j$  enters first. Case 1: last probe from  $i$  arrives at  $j$  before  $j$  enters CS.




Then  $j$  must be in trying region since

$$u \geq t = t0 - 2 \geq u0 - 2 > u0 - 6 \geq u1.$$

Hence probe will cause reset at  $j$ . Contradiction.

## Mutual Exclusion (cnt)

Case 2: last probe from  $i$  arrives at  $j$  after  $j$  enters CS.  
Then  $j$  will send reply message to  $i$ .



When reply arrives,  $i$  is still in trying region.  
Hence reply will cause reset at  $i$ . Contradiction.

# Jasper's Abstraction

**Idea:** Replace hosts 3 to  $n$  by a **Chaos** automaton, which can generate any message at any time.

Manual correctness proof of this abstraction is easy.  
(Compositional proof more involved)

For system with two hosts and **Chaos**, Uppaal can prove ME for the two hosts.

General ME follows by symmetry!

# Summary of Results

1. Simple Uppaal **model** of critical part of Zeroconf, almost good enough for inclusion in standard.
2. Very close **correspondence** between model and standard; only probabilistic aspects cannot be handled.
3. Several **mistakes/ambiguities** found in standard.
4. Model checking of system with  $n$  hosts using manual abstraction proof.
5. Manual proof of ME easy.
6. Several suggestions for further **improving** TA technology.

## Future Work

1. Better support for computing abstractions (or proving their correctness) essential: only abstractions can bridge gap between realistic and tractable models
2. Study host failure, message loss and joining of networks
3. **Challenge:** Can we prove (approximate) correctness of IPDS'03 model?
4. Combine functionality Uppaal and PRISM!!!